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 1 
Introduction 
In March 2009, the Obama administration sent a message to senior 
Pentagon staff instructing them to refrain from using either of the terms 
‘Long War’ or ‘Global War on Terror’ and to replace these terms with 
‘Overseas Contingency Operations’.i Similarly, the new UK strategy for 
Countering International Terrorism eschews military terminology, 
emphasising instead a risk-based approach to managing and reducing the 
threat from international terrorism.ii Governments and policy-makers seem 
to recognise that regulating all manner of risk effectively is now shaping a 
wide array of policy initiatives and regulations. Indeed, being perceived as 
ineffective when regulating risk is tantamount to mishandling the security 
and safety of citizens. Since 2008, the British government has conducted a 
National Risk Assessment and has published a dedicated National Risk 
Register ‘to increase awareness of the kinds of risks the UK faces, and 
encourage individuals and organisations to think about their own 
preparedness’.iii   
This deeply political concern with risk and a culture of fear however should 
not surprise IR scholars familiar with the work of Ulrich Beck. For in Beck’s 
Risk Society, ‘established risk definitions are thus a magic wand with which a 
society can terrify itself and thereby activate its political centres and become 
politicised from within’.iv It is also expected that resources will then be 
allocated by governments to regulate and manage such risks. Following the 
work of Beck, scholars such as Rasmussen, Coker, and Heng have argued 
that the conduct of war by the Bush administration in and of itself 
constituted a risk management approach to the problem of international 
terrorism with a particular focus on the pre-emptive use of force.v Others 
using both a Beck-inspired framework and those who have developed a 
more Foucaultian approach have examined the various technologies of risk 
management that have emerged in what we might call the ‘Other’ War on 
Terror.vi If there is a common theme to these disparate approaches to the 
question of risk, then it is to be found in the recognition of the increasing 
significance of controlling risks efficiently in the age of terror.  
 This paper seeks to locate itself within Beck-inspired approaches to 
risk and to explore the role of risk bureaucracies and the risk-based 
regulatory approaches that states deploy in confronting international 
terrorism. The discussion builds on existing research by Hood et al on how 
regulatory states in Beck’s Risk Society manage risks such as dangerous dogs 
and domestic radon gas.vii We extend the focus to trans-national terrorism 
by taking the cases of the US regulatory frameworks on aviation security and 
that of the UK on terrorist financing. These are of course also presented in 
the context of the overlapping global-level regulatory environment as well.  
The emergence of such risk regulatory regimes however is neither assumed 
nor predicted. The subjective and constructed nature of risk perceptions 
suggests that any emergent regulatory framework based on increased risk 
consciousness can never be considered a foregone conclusion. However, the 
Bush administration’s emphasis on brute military force hindered the 
development and recognition of genuinely risk-based approaches to the 
challenges of terrorism. The change in tone and, potentially, substance from 
the Obama White House implies risk-based governance approaches may 
play a more significant role in the war on terror. This is not to argue that risk 
based approaches to countering the threat of terrorism are a panacea but 
rather that the development of such approaches should be examined in 
greater detail than hitherto has been the case. While recognising the 
limitations of risk regulatory regimes ability to accurately calculate and 
manage risk, we argue that the increasing bureacratization of these 
mechanisms have embedded them in contemporary social life. Therefore 
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they may well provide a template for the future management of terrorist and 
other risks and allow us to understand how modern states are adapting to an 
era of globalised risks.  
The paper will begin with a discussion of the risk framework underpinning 
the analysis with a particular focus on the existing literature regarding the 
relationship between Beck’s Risk Society and how regulatory states regulate 
new types of risks through ‘risk bureaucracies’ and risk regulatory regimes. It 
will then move to analyse less-noticed aspects of the ‘other’ war on terror 
that reflected the emerging bureaucratisation of risk, with risk-based 
approaches built into regulatory frameworks for managing terrorist 
financing and aviation security at overlapping global and national levels. The 
concluding section then discusses prospects for further bureaucratisation of 
risk as the Obama administration distances itself from the militaristic tone 
adopted by its predecessors. 
  
Regulatory states and the Risk Society: the 
bureaucratisation of risk 
Though the concept of Risk has become prevalent across the social sciences 
in the past decade or so, risk approaches vary in their inspiration from 
sociology in the work of Beck, Luhmann, Giddens, Douglas and othersviii; 
from governmentality derived from Foucault, Ewald and Castelix; and 
criminology in the work of O’Malley and Ericson.x Not only do such 
approaches vary in inspiration, several authors have mixed and matched 
between the different yet commensurable approaches to the question of risk 
and society.xi Despite the various approaches taken, the questions posed are 
similar. If, as Beck has noted, ‘being at global risk is the human condition of 
the 21st century’xii then what are the implications for the political practices 
that in the past have sought to claim a monopoly on the provision of 
security, namely the state.  
The problem of terrorism is just the sort of globalised de-territorialised 
challenge that Beck had envisioned as symptomatic of the world risk 
society.xiii. As Duffield warned: 
This time, given the radical non-territoriality of network war, which also 
embraces the racial dynamics of metropolitan society, a deepening 
securitization of everyday life would seem inevitable.xiv 
As the war on terror evolves, it is the creeping securitisation of everyday life 
through the bureaucratisation associated with emerging risk regulatory 
regimes that concerns this paper. However the Bush administration’s 
insistence that the war would be on a generalised enemy called ‘terror’ rather 
than the organisation, Al Qaeda,xv led to the inevitable ambiguity regarding 
the risk that was to be managed. As Stump has noted: 
The meaning of ‘terrorism’ in any particular instantiation can vary 
considerably depending on the context, the available cultural resources, and 
the combinations of people in varying positions involved…critical terrorism 
studies should focus on how the terrorism discourse is creatively invoked by 
people in everyday contexts to stabilize and legitimate over-lapping and 
often competing constructions of identity and security policy.xvi 
 
This problem of perception presents a fundamental challenge to accounts of 
the war on terror in terms of risk. Much has been made of the radical 
‘othering’ engaged in by the Bush administration in the lead up to the wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraqxvii and the disagreements that such risk perceptions 
and constructions caused at the international level. As Meyer has noted, 
threat perception varies radically over space and time and therefore agreeing 
on strategies of response can be difficult. Even in cases such as 9/11, 
though convergence of perceptions in both the intensity and nature of a 
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specific risk do occur, such convergence can be fleeting.xviii However to 
accept that the construction of risk is both a social and political act is not to 
deny that actual risks present actual dangers to the public. As Bill 
McSweeney has argued in relation to the broader issue of the social 
construction of security: 
A critical difference appears, however, when we consider that the perception 
and fear of threats to security can, in principle, be checked by observing and 
evaluating the facts external to the subject.xix  
 
In other words at some level an analysis of the War on terror needs to 
grapple not just with the issue of the construction of the terrorist risk by the 
principal political actors but also be conscious of the actual danger 
presented by that risk in order to assess global responses. In this way Beck 
differs from other theorists of risk such as Mary Douglas, by arguing 
explicitly for the necessity of a ‘risk consciousness’ to emerge to transform 
contemporary society in order to deal with the array of risks it faces.xx We 
are conscious of criticisms of Beck’s work regarding his relative neglect of 
the subjective nature of risk perception and therefore his underemphasising 
of the role of power relations in the construction and determination of risk 
and response. That said the appropriate response, we argue, is not to jettison 
Beck’s ideas completely but rather to critically engage with them and use 
them to help us understand the mechanisms of risk regulation in the past 
decade, or as Mythen put it:  
Metaphorically speaking we need to farm the fruits of Beck’s harvest at the 
same time as uprooting some of the weeds.xxi 
 
If risk is subjectively perceived and constructed then the self-perpetuating 
vicious cycle of risk creation and subsequent impetus for regulation is the 
driving dynamic behind Beck’s ‘risk society’. The increasing consciousness 
of risk propels the proliferation of risk management industries seeking to 
reduce these risks that capture the public imagination. Risk management 
industries are well-known in the financial and business world. In the field of 
government and regulation, the emphasis on managing all manner of risk 
has also permeated the main bureaucratic tools of government. Yet some 
risks generate dedicated risk bureaucracies in attempts at better regulation, 
while other risks simply do not get the same attention. This results in a 
‘concealed, responsive, self-politicisation of hazards in public perception, 
politics and the hazard bureaucracy.’xxii Beck’s argument suggests to us that 
increasingly government departments and regulatory agencies are assuming 
the form of a ‘risk bureaucracy’ dedicated to forecasting and developing 
risk-based guidelines to regulate and manage risks. For instance, the UK has 
its Health and Safety Executive, as well as its Foods Standards Agency. 
These are focused on identifying and then developing measures to regulate 
risks, whether they be the risk of BSE in beef, passenger safety issues on 
trains or occupational hazards. The HSE for instance recommends key ‘Five 
steps to risk management’ to focus on the risks that really matter in the 
workplace.xxiii The UK body linked most closely to the issue of terrorist 
financing is the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The FSA employs an 
explicitly termed ‘risk-based approach’ to regulation. This is symptomatic of 
a deeper underlying trend as ‘such risk-based approaches by regulators are 
here to stay and will become increasingly popular’.xxiv The trend is mirrored 
in the US regulatory efforts on aviation security too, with a new post-9/11 
risk bureaucracy established. As this paper demonstrates, the Transportation 
Security Administration deploys similar risk-based analyses and risk 
management logic. 
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Despite the ‘growing awareness of the globally interconnected form of 
threats, nation-states still provide key institutional contexts’ through which 
these risks are being constructed as well as regulated.xxv As Giddens 
contended, states have and still are defined by their relative monopoly on 
administrative resources, technical expertise, bureaucratic intelligence and 
institutional influence. It is the very collective resources of government 
bureaucracies that Giddens described as the ‘administrative power of the 
state’.xxvi While we accept that there are widely varying views of theories of 
the state in dealing with new global challenges, we are drawn here towards 
Beck’s suggestion that states are increasingly having to develop ‘risk 
bureaucracies’ to protect their populations from all manner of risk.xxvii In 
our case, we are concerned with how states protect their people from 
terrorist financing and aviation security risks. Beck has been less than 
charitable with his assessments of how risk bureaucracies only serve to 
appease public anxieties. We are more concerned with the ways in which 
risk has been bureaucratised into regulatory guidelines as states increasingly 
operate within complex global frameworks and engage with governance 
networks involving private corporations and civic groups. Risk and safety is 
seen as one of the major regulatory growth points for the ‘regulatory state’ 
in a risk society where the government’s role as regulator is advancing into 
new domains with the establishment of new risk bureaucracies and rules to 
manage risk.xxviii Comparisons can be made here with Weber’s famous ‘iron 
cage’ of bureaucracy that operated according to a set of rules and procedures 
which made sense to bureaucrats and government. Consequently, human 
life became driven by efficiency, with ever more efficient rules devised for 
problem-solving purposes. The bureaucratisation of risk-based guidelines 
means however that increasingly new rules and regulations are built around 
risk and the need to assess and reduce risk rather than resolve problems 
definitely. We should stress that what Beck envisions in the Risk Society is 
not so much the demise of states and their regulatory powers. Rather, he 
thinks that states can reinvigorate themselves in the process of managing 
risk. In particular we are concerned with existing debates on how the 
regulatory state operates within Beck’s Risk Society and the subsequent rise 
of risk bureaucracies. Taking our cue from Hood et al.xxix, as an analytic 
point of departure, we look at three fundamental components of a Risk 
Regulation Regime (RRR) and how risk is being bureaucratised in the 
process. These are 1. the director which refers to the setting of targets and 
goals; 2. detector which examines how the existing state of the system is 
observed. 3. the effector which considers how power and influence are 
brought about to bring change. While Hood et al limited their analyses to 
domestic regimes, we chose terrorist financing and aviation security in this 
paper as both involve a global regulatory dimension and complex multi-level 
governance networks that overlap with and shape domestic risk 
bureaucracies.  
 
Risk-based approaches to regulating the ‘Other’ 
War on Terror 
As mentioned in the introduction, the ‘hot’ wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
generated much debate within both academia and society at large. Less 
discussed were the non-military aspects of the War on Terror. It is worth 
remembering in light of this rather skewed focus that at the outset the Bush 
administration did in fact highlight the multifaceted nature of their efforts.xxx 
One of the first acts was the issuance of Executive Order 13224 on 
Terrorist financing which the President insisted on announcing himself on 
24 September 2001xxxi 
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There were two main strands of what we might term the war on terrorist 
financing and the RRRs being developed to control the risks. On the one 
hand there was the unilateral approach best captured by EO 13224, which 
sought to freeze terrorist assets and to prohibit transactions either directly or 
indirectly with individuals or organisations deemed to be of suspicion by US 
citizens.xxxii Such mechanisms are only as effective as the quality of the 
intelligence that allows them to adequately target the right people. In the 
case of EO 13224 the difficulties of doing so and the inadvertent 
consequences of misapplying these powers quickly became apparent. 
Simultaneously however, there was also a more multilateral risk-based 
approach to the problem via a pre-existing global entity called the ‘Financial 
Action Task Force’ (FATF).  
What attracts us is the explicitly stated risk-based mechanisms such as the 
FATF 40+9 Recommendations through which the FATF seeks to influence 
the global financial regulatory environment. In this case, the FATF serves as 
the director, setting benchmark targets and goals to be achieved. Initially 
established in 1989, the FATF was tasked with standardising international 
anti-money laundering mechanisms with a particular focus on the 
international narcotics trade. Post-9/11 it was seen as an ideal candidate for 
dealing with the challenge of terrorist financing. Both the US 2006 National 
Strategy for Counter-terrorism and the UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy 
highlighted the importance of standard setting and the role of FATF in 
creating and maintaining a global anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF) regime. 
The mechanics of this new regime fits the risk regulation regime in a 
number of ways.  
Firstly, the FATF itself operates as a standard-setting institution adopting a 
set of global risk-based guidelines known as the 40+9 Recommendations 
that at least officially relies on the cooperation of a diverse number of states. 
In this director role, the benchmark standards are set by FATF but also 
increasingly in consultation with the private sector. Notably, FATF 
recognises that ‘the private sector is at the front line of the international 
battle against money laundering, terrorist financing and other illicit financing 
threats.’xxxiii The FATF President stressed in his 2007/08 Annual Report, 
‘one of my key priorities has been to develop a more open and constructive 
working partnership with the private sector in order to raise awareness of 
the FATF’s work, to inform FATF policymaking and to encourage more 
effective implementation of AML/CFT measures’.xxxiv In October 2007, the 
FATF launched the Private Sector Consultative Forum to strengthen 
existing dialogue with key private sector bodies from around the world and 
promote implementation of risk-based standards. In June 2007, in close 
consultation with members of the international banking and securities sector 
such as the Japanese Bankers Association, European Association of Public 
Banks, and JPMorgan Chase, the FATF jointly published, ‘Guidance on the 
Risk-Based Approach to combating Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing’. The aim was to ‘support the development of a common 
understanding of what the risk-based approach involves and to indicate 
good practice in the design and implementation of effective risk-based 
approaches’.xxxv This document essentially advocates the benefits of 
adopting a broad risk-based framework as a shared governance and 
regulatory platform while recognising the most appropriate format remains 
dependent on individual country risks. The FATF also has a joint working 
arrangement with the Wolfsberg Group of twelve global banks. In 2006, the 
Wolfsberg Group issued ‘Guidance on a Risk-Based Approach for 
Managing Money Laundering Risks’. By fostering the industry standard, 
which is now ‘risk-based rather than a rule-based voluntary code’, the 
Wolfsberg group by assuming some director responsibilities has helped to 
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bridge the gap in attitudes to banking practice and standards, especially 
between American and European banks.xxxvi Overall, this Wolfsberg process 
is often cited as an example of the private sector getting active on their own 
initiative and cost, recognising a need for standardised risk-based norms 
against global terrorist financing. Previously banks would have left the issue 
in the hands of national regulators.xxxvii  
Secondly, the FATF 40+9 recommendations help provide detector capabilities 
by focussing on terrorist financing based on risk management logic. Thus, 
‘the risk-based approach is either incorporated into the Recommendations 
in specific and limited ways, or it is inherently part of or linked to those 
Recommendations.’xxxviii Under Recommendation 5 for instance, a country’s 
financial institutions must perform enhanced due diligence for higher-risk 
customers. A risk-based approach also means ‘a risk analysis must be 
performed to determine where the money laundering and terrorist financing 
risks are the greatest. Countries will need to identify the main vulnerabilities 
and address them accordingly.’ Indicative of an emerging global consensus 
on these risk-based approaches as a shared regulatory platform, these 
Recommendations have been endorsed by the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as benchmark global standards. UN 
Security Council Resolution 1617 in 2005 also ‘strongly urges all member 
states to implement the comprehensive international standards’ contained in 
FATF recommendations. Judging from the numerous documents it has 
published on the topic, risk-based global norms are now seen by the FATF 
to provide a framework for negotiations with a range of partners in its 
attempts to proliferate and implement these common standards worldwide. 
These common risk-based standards were to be employed as a form of 
detector by which the global financial system is to be observed and monitored 
for the risk of terrorist financing. In the UK, such global risk-based 
approaches have been bureaucratised at domestic regulatory state level by 
being incorporated into guidelines issued by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA).xxxix Like its American risk bureaucracy counterpart, the Office of 
Terrorist Financing in the US Treasury which also issues ‘risk-based’ anti-
terrorist financing guidelinesxl, the FSA is involved in regulatory policy 
discussions and implementation. The FSA was set up in 2001 and right from 
the start, indicated that it would adopt an ‘operative framework designed to 
identify the main risks to its statutory objectives as they arose and to help 
plan how to address those risks’.xli The FSA intended to use this risk-based 
approach to fulfil the ‘rule making, supervision and enforcement powers’ 
assigned to it by the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000). Indeed, 
‘taking a risk-based approach is a key element of the FSA’s strategy to meet 
the principles of good regulation.’xlii The current framework in place is 
ARROW II (Advanced Risk-Responsive Operating Framework). Using this 
framework, scores are assigned to firms depending on the risks they pose. 
The basic principles required for firms to have procedures in place for are 
‘risk identification and assessment’, ‘risk mitigation’, and ‘risk monitoring’.xliii 
These include knowing your customers and monitoring customer activities. 
While FSA has principal responsibility, the risk-based approach also 
recognises that ‘a lot of the expertise in assessing risk lies with the 
firms…they know their products and their customers’.xliv Here individual 
firms are expected to provide detector functions, with the understanding that 
a risk-based approach allows firms to maximise their resources by 
prioritising areas of concern. The UK private financial services industry has 
been proactive in this aspect, with the Joint Money Laundering Steering 
Group publishing guidance on sharpening the risk-based approach to 
combating terrorist financing.xlv 
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Thirdly, compliance and enforcement responsibilities largely fall on private 
actors in the financial industry. Here private actors are to assume functions 
of the effector in bring about change in their regulatory regimes. As Sharman 
has noted: 
it is private financial firms following FATF-mandated rules legislated by 
national governments that have borne most of the burden of fighting 
money-laundering.xlvi 
  
Larger financial institutions are better able to bear increased administrative 
burdens of implementing the risk-based regulatory guidelines such as 
‘Know-Your-Customer’ (KYC) legislation, leaving smaller firms at a 
disadvantage. Powerful actors such as the EU and the US have driven the 
agenda and set the rules. Especially with regards to intransigent states who 
fail to live up to 40+9 standards, they are often compelled by threat of 
sanction or blacklisting to do so. Legitimate or not, direct coercion in the 
form of blacklisting was a ‘deliberate and calculated use of power by the 
FATF to impose policies that elicited instrumental compliance by states’.xlvii 
There was ‘nothing subtle’ about the blacklist.xlviii Material penalties arose 
for states blacklisted as they became perceived to pose increased risks 
bringing higher costs of doing business. In such cases then, the FATF itself 
takes on some of the effector functions in bringing about change through 
power and influence although legally it has no such authority. Perceptions 
both of the extent and nature of the terrorist risk differ widely among 
compliant states suggesting that arm twisting is more relevant than any 
shared global risk assessment.  
 
Aviation Security 
Aviation security received heightened attention in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks. Aviation security here refers to the idea that airports and air travel 
are key sites where RRRs interact directly with citizens but that such regimes 
are not necessarily restricted to the airport or even aeroplanes. However, as 
Salter has noted: 
contemporary security analysis of aviation takes place within a realist, 
empiricist frame that simply reinforces the state-centric assumption of 
power politics. It ignores the networked nature of threats and the complex 
web of state and non-state security actors that actually provide security.xlix 
 
The events of 9/11 represent the crystallisation of the transformed nature of 
security risks in a globalised world. Unlike global terrorist financing, aviation 
security regimes lacked any overarching institutional arrangements, even 
ones as relatively informal and nebulous as the FATF we have seen 
previously. Security standards and institutional formations varied widely 
from country to country and therefore demanded different responses from 
the actors concerned. In examining changes introduced post-9/11, we can 
highlight the role that risk-based approaches are playing, the consequent 
bureaucratisation of risk, and the interaction between private and public 
sector actors as well as global and national regulatory regimes.  
In the US, where direct responsibility for aviation security was previously 
distributed across a large number of Federal and state actors, both private 
and public, there were swift moves to centralise and standardise security 
policy and delivery under a new Federal agency. The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) was to become the new risk bureaucracy dedicated to 
managing aviation security risks.l The TSA has gone to much effort to 
constantly define itself as employing a ‘risk-based approach to secure US 
transportation systems.’ li As a way of re-allocating limited resources to 
higher-risk issues, for instance, in 2007 it lifted the ban on lighters, arguing 
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that lighters no longer posed a significant risk. In this instance, the TSA is 
assuming director functions, setting new risk-based guidelines as best practice. 
TSA head Kip Hawley has been particularly keen on adopting the risk-based 
approach on all issues from screening of high-risk cargo security to airport 
employees with access to secure areas. The idea is that assessing risk will 
enable regulators to decide where to focus their priorities and more 
efficiently provide security without undue disruption. It means risk-profiling 
people with hostile intent that are potentially bad with additional scrutiny, 
rather than simply looking for ‘bad’ objects such as knives or lighters. As 
Hawley put it, ‘the transportation system is vast and largely open, therefore 
our job is risk management, not universal protection’.lii  
This risk-based approach incorporated into TSA regulations and guidelines 
was also seen to serve detector functions, enabling the TSA to constantly 
assess and monitor the existing level of risks being posed to aviation 
security. Risk-based guidelines were also issued to airports ranging from 
restrictions on liquids and gels, baggage screening to background checks on 
airport staff. If it was felt that certain risks were no longer significant, there 
would be changes made as a result.  
The critical problem from the RRR perspective however was the previous 
lack of an effector with the ability to implement and regulate standards across 
the industry. By placing responsibility for the entire airport site with a single 
federal risk bureaucracy the administration in one fell swoop simplified the 
control and oversight structures in the existing bureaucracy although this is 
not to claim coordination problems do not persist. TSA’s Office of 
Inspection for instance conducts risk-based covert testing at airports to 
identify vulnerabilities and assess the performance of the aviation security 
regime. When it comes to the trilogy of director, detector and enforcer functions 
in regulating aviation security however, the US, despite changes introduced 
by the TSA, deploys a ‘decidedly mixed system’.liii Despite it being the 
national regulator and policy-maker setting rules, TSA must also carry out 
baggage and passenger screening at airports. Yet other security functions 
such as terminal policing and access control are the responsibility of the 
airport, under TSA oversight. Thus, ‘TSA combines regulation and service 
provision within a single entity, a troubling conflict of interest which violates 
the principle of arms-length regulation’.liv  
In the EU, no common aviation security regulations existed where direct 
state control of aviation security was the norm rather the exception. After 
9/11, reform took place at the director and effector levels with the creation of 
the first supranational regulatory framework for managing aviation security. 
Included in this new framework were detector systems in the form of 
mandatory inspections by Commission officials, in collaboration with the 
European Aviation Safety Agency and member states.lv Oversight and 
enforcer functions is also extended beyond the EU countries through the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) who also engage in regular 
audits and provide assistance for member states to bring their practices up 
to ‘best practices’.lvi The bureaucratisation of risk in the form of European 
regulations can be seen in the fourth section of Article 4 of EC No. 
300/2008 issued in May 2008 which permits member states to “adopt 
alternative security measures that provide an adequate level of protection on 
the basis of a local risk assessment.”lvii Security measures are to adapt to 
evolving risk assessments as they arise. This particular piece of regulation 
highlighted the need for flexibility in responding to risk assessments, 
without specifying technical or procedural details of implementation. For 
instance, EU-wide regulations that prohibit liquids in hand luggage were 
introduced to lower risk of liquid explosives. Thus the EU reforms extend 
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beyond the nation-state, although states remain a central actor, the Director in 
this case is, at least formally, supranational.  
However, due to the inherent nature of global aviation, a global-level risk 
regulatory regime for aviation security makes most sense. The US National 
Strategy for Aviation Security has proposed a: 
‘risk-based, cross-discipline, and global approach to aviation security’.lviii 
In this regard, the global private airline trade body, International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) has assumed some director functions in 
attempting to set targets and benchmarks for policy-making. It 
recommended a risk-based approach to setting global standards,   
The next step is for governments to harmonize a risk-based approach to 
security…. We need a constant level of vigilance that is constantly adjusted 
to deal with specific threats or events. To achieve this, we must develop a 
common risk-assessment methodology.lix  
 
Indeed, IATA has consistently promoted ‘a risk-based approach to security 
among governments, developing a common risk-assessment methodology’.lx 
Here the global trade body IATA, much like the FATF, is in effect 
endorsing the use of risk-based guidelines such as those contained in its 
IATA Security Manual as a possible global platform to bring all actors 
together to negotiate on and manage shared aviation security risks. Once 
again, as with the FATF, a set of risk-based guidelines is being promoted to 
serve detector functions to monitor and observe the level of risks in the 
system. However the extent of such reform should not be overstated, as the 
IATA’s CEO put it bluntly,  
security is an uncoordinated mess. Governments are not cooperating; and 
nobody is taking leadership. They must focus on risk management, 
harmonise global standards, use technology and intelligence effectively and 
take responsibility for the bill.lxi  
 
Here, the IATA CEO has pinpointed crucial flaws of the global aviation 
RRR. There is lack of a central global aviation security body that would fulfil 
director functions, as well as weak effectors with the power to enforce change. 
IATA conducts safety audits of airlines but only on a voluntary basis. From 
a detector perspective though, one of the most striking developments has 
been the elaborate ‘dataveillance’ techniques deployed to engage in social 
sorting between risky and other individuals. Even more remarkable as 
Amoore and others have highlighted is the highly technocratic approach to 
these questions, where such social sorting has become a problem for 
technological rather than political discussion.lxii The persistent problem 
though has been how risk might be measured at aviation security sites. At 
the blunt end of such techniques has been the use of ‘Watch-lists’, 
containing the names of persons and organisations classified on a scale of 
riskiness. However the usefulness of this approach has been questioned 
both in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. As Bennett has noted: 
One FBI agent described the initial screening process as a ‘massive data 
dump’ of anybody with a connection to terrorism, which the TSC [the 
Terrorist Screening Centre at the FBI] has been trying to clean up ever 
since.lxiii 
 
Despite the blunt nature of such lists and the problems of their 
composition, they do at least tie in with a governance approach in that their 
effectiveness is in part reliant on the willing cooperation of private actors, in 
this case airlines, to bear the costs of collecting, collating and transferring 
data on risks to state authorities.lxiv Large scale collection and analysis of 
data on passengers has been developed in aviation security regimes ranging 
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from requirements for biometric security features on passports, Passenger 
name records, finger printing at border access points etc. These data 
collection and control techniques operate to effectively break each 
‘individual into a set of measurable risk factors.’lxv Increasingly air travellers 
are subjected to a dense web of social control as they pass through the 
variety of security assemblages both physical and electronic. Despite this, as 
Salter has noted, 
the public imaginary has become fixated on the inconveniences of travel and 
not on the increased securitization of everyday life.lxvi 
 
The question remains as to what extent are the risk regulatory regimes 
themselves responsible for first constituting and then bureaucratising the 
risk as states scramble to regulate aviation security risks? Muller has 
discussed this at length in terms of the notion of ‘trusted traveller’, a 
particular form of subjectivity produced by the interface between the citizen 
traveller and various biometric controls deployed at airport sites.  
the Trusted traveller…[is] constituted through the surveillant gaze of 
technology, where one’s inconspicuousness is prized above all else.lxvii 
 
Thus the detector aspect of the global aviation RRR is reliant not so much on 
the measurability of risk but rather on deploying technologies of surveillance 
to socially sort individuals by categories of riskiness. It is, as Lahav has 
noted, worth considering: 
who has been setting the agenda, who is delegating, and who is the agency? 
It is important to understand that the impetus for the new rules of the game 
has come from states themselves.lxviii 
 
In other words although the Bush administration’s aviation security policy 
may have called for a risk-based global approach to the issue of aviation 
security, the practice has been driven by the establishment and enforcement 
of watch-lists and standards by the state and driven by a Western, if not 
solely US, concern with what exactly constitutes risk.  
 
‘Overseas contingency operations’ and the Obama 
administration in a world of risk 
On entering office the Obama administration pursued a number of 
significant policy changes. In series of set-piece speeches in 2009, President 
Obama outlined what he saw as both US and global security challenges. The 
emphasis on the globalised nature of the risks involved would have 
heartened Ulrich Beck himself. Speaking in Cairo, Obama argued: 
For we have learned from recent experience that when a financial system 
weakens in one country, prosperity is hurt everywhere. When a new flu 
infects one human being, all are at risk. When one nation pursues a nuclear 
weapon, the risk of nuclear attack rises for all nations. When innocents in 
Bosnia and Darfur are slaughtered, that is a stain on our collective 
conscience. That is what it means to share in this world in the 21st 
century.lxix  
The question is whether such changes in tone would be followed by 
significant changes in the substance of policy. One of these changes 
involved a simple name change, as noted in the introduction. In March 2009 
a discreet memo was circulated at the Pentagon asking speech writers to 
refrain from using the terms ‘Long war’ or ‘War on terror’ and to replace 
them with the more anodyne phrase ‘Overseas Contingency Operations.’lxx 
This change, though drawing ridicule from some circles, did herald 
significant changes both symbolically and in practical terms. Indeed this 
different framing of the terrorist and broader foreign policy challenges 
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facing the US by Obama was already evident in the primary campaigns.lxxi 
Furthermore by downgrading the stakes in the conflict from the existential 
to the more mundane aspects of security, such a move opened up more 
possibilities for multi-lateral cooperation in the risk-based governance of 
terrorism. A recent report on US strategy has highlighted the difficulties that 
still remain in reshaping US defence institutions in order to manage risks 
and in particular deliver homeland security: 
DoD [Department of Defense] is still inherently a hammer. Defense-
relevant HLS [Homeland Security] challenges on the other hand are not 
nails.lxxii 
 
Yet, by having its risk-based regulatory standards adopted by the World 
Bank, IMF and the UN via a number of Security Council resolutions, the 
FATF has already made some progress in the direction of more formal 
institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of risk as it tries to tailor-make risk 
regulatory regimes for specific risks.lxxiii The Obama administration 
particularly emphasises the risk-based approach to identify particular 
vulnerabilities of financial systems that pose risks, and is especially 
concerned about terrorist financing risks from Iran. The question of aviation 
security returned to the forefront with the failed attempt to explode a device 
on board a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009. The 
incident highlighted the flaws of relying on ‘watch-lists’ as a primary means 
of providing airport security as Mr Abdulmutallab has been brought to the 
attentions of US intelligence by his father who was concerned by his alleged 
extreme views. However, he was not placed on the top-level watch-list that 
would have prevented him from boarding.lxxivAs a result of this perceived 
failing there has been a heightened focus on alternative modes of securing 
and managing risk. Both the UK and the US have committed to rolling out 
new body scanning technology which effectively equates to the ability to 
strip search passengers without the actual necessity of removing their 
clothes. Furthermore the US introduced additional security measures 
including pat-down body searches and hand-luggage searches targeting 
passengers arriving from Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ian, Sudan, Yemen and 
Cuba.lxxv Underpinning these changes is a broad ranging risk management 
approach aimed at revealing ‘risky’ individuals even where little or no 
existing intelligence or evidence would alert authorities to their presence. 
Arguably some of the techniques deployed move beyond the logic of risk 
with its focus on prediction and on to a logic of premediation by focusing 
on the ability to anticipate or at least imagine all possible futures.lxxvi The 
events of last Christmas suggest that the techniques of dataveillance 
deployed in the past to identify known miscreants will now be deployed in 
the future to identify, anticipate and pre-empt unknown risky individuals.lxxvii  
 
Conclusion 
Having discussed the emergence of a risk-based approach to the war on 
terror under the Bush administration and its continuation under Obama, a 
number of questions need to be raised. What are the implications for more 
efficiently regulating global risk in a World Risk Society dominated by 
border-transcending risks where the principal political actors remain 
territorially defined states? 
Thomas Weiss has argued that both academia and practitioners might 
perhaps need to move beyond the focus on governance and grasp the nettle 
of global government: only more robust global institutions can deliver the 
public good of global security.lxxviii But as long as global government remains 
elusive, the bureaucratisation of risk in the FATF and to a lesser extent 
within the aviation security regime may indeed provide an alternative 
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template for the identification, management and allocation of resources to 
regulating global risks. However, states, and powerful states in particular, 
will continue to dominate the construction and conduct of such regimes.  
The key question is the extent to which bureaucratised RRRs can provide 
reliable calculations of future risks and take appropriate steps to prevent 
these dangers from achieving realisation. We have argued here that rather 
than the provision of absolute universal security, the more modest 
calculation and management of insecurity by states through the 
establishment of dedicated risk bureaucracies has generated new risk-based 
regulatory regimes. Thus the structures that have emerged over the past 9 
years or so may well provide the model for the future, particularly as the 
bureaucratic nature of these initiatives allows them to renew themselves and 
adapt to new challenges, as we saw in the case of the FATF’s shift from 
money-laundering to terrorist financing.  The state is not likely to be 
eclipsed but rather, as Beck argued, states can reinvigorate themselves and 
extend their regulatory reach in the process of managing risk. As the war on 
terror evolves away from its dramatic ‘hot’ phase, the emerging 
bureaucratisation of risk-based approaches might well herald the 
‘routinisation’ of this war such that counter-terrorism regulations now 
become mundane and embedded into the securitisation of activities 
associated with daily life such as boarding passenger airplanes and going to 
the bank. Risk bureaucrats and their risk-based regulations are here to stay. 
If the dramatic use of military force has not proved satisfactory so far in the 
war on terror, why not let the bureaucrats have a go? 
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